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2.3.2 LOSA is defined by the following ten operating
characteristics that act to ensure the integrity of the LOSA
methodology and its data. Without these characteristics, it is
not a LOSA. These characteristics are:
1. Jump-seat observations during normal flight
operations: LOSA observations are limited to
regularly scheduled flights. Line checks, initial line
indoctrination or other training flights are off-limits
due to the extra level of stress put upon the pilots
during these types of situations. Having another
observer on board only adds to an already high stress
level, thus providing an unrealistic picture of performance.
In order for the data to be representative
of normal operations, LOSA observations must be
collected on regular and routine flights.
2. Joint management / pilot sponsorship: In order for
LOSA to succeed as a viable safety programme, it
is essential that both management and pilots
(through their professional association, if it exists)
support the project. The joint sponsorship provides
a “check and balance” for the project to ensure that
change, as necessary, will be made as a result of
LOSA data. When considering whether to conduct
a LOSA audit, the first question to be asked by
airline management is whether the pilots endorse the
project. If the answer is “No”, the project should not
be initiated until endorsement is obtained. This issue
is so critical in alleviating pilot suspicion that the
existing LOSA philosophy is to deny airline
assistance if a signed agreement is not in place
before commencing a LOSA. A LOSA steering
committee is formed with representatives from both
groups and is responsible for planning, scheduling,
observer support and, later, data verification (see
Point 8).
3. Voluntary crew participation: Maintaining the
integrity of LOSA within an airline and the industry
as a whole is extremely important for long-term
success. One way to accomplish this goal is to
collect all observations with voluntary crew
participation. Before conducting LOSA observations,
an observer must first obtain the flight
crew’s permission to be observed. The crew has the
option to decline, with no questions asked. The
observer simply approaches another flight crew on
another flight and asks for their permission to be
observed. If an airline conducts a LOSA and has an
unreasonably high number of refusals by crews to be
observed, then it should serve as an indicator to the
airline that there are critical “trust” issues to be dealt
with first.
4. De-identified, confidential and safety-minded data
collection: LOSA observers are asked not to record
names, flight numbers, dates or any other
information that can identify a crew. This allows for
a level of protection against disciplinary actions. The
purpose of LOSA is to collect safety data, not to
punish pilots. Airlines cannot allow themselves to
squander a unique opportunity to gain insight into
their operations by having pilots fearful that a LOSA
observation could be used against them for
disciplinary reasons. If a LOSA observation is ever
used for disciplinary reasons, the acceptance of
LOSA within the airline will most probably be lost
forever. Over 6 000 LOSA observations have been
conducted by The University of Texas at Austin
Human Factors Research Project and not one has
ever been used to discipline a pilot.
5. Targeted observation instrument: The current data
collection tool to conduct a LOSA is the LOSA
Observation Form. It is not critical that an airline use
this form, but whatever data collection instrument is
used needs to target issues that affect flight crew
performance in normal operations. An example of
2-6 Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)
the LOSA Observation Form is shown in
Appendix A. The form is based upon the UTTEM
Model and generates data for a variety of topics,
including the following:
• Flight and crew demographics such as city pairs,
aircraft type, flight time, years of experience
within the airline, years of experience within
position, and crew familiarity;
• Written narratives describing what the crew did
well, what they did poorly and how they
managed threats or errors for each phase of the
flight;
• CRM performance ratings using researchdeveloped
behavioural markers;
• Technical worksheet for the descent/approach/
land phases that highlights the type of approach
flown, landing runway and whether the crew met
airline stabilized approach parameters;
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