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errors that are not observable by a single receiver. Longer baselines translate to better performance in MDE;
b) SBAS. Since SBAS augmentation provides monitoring of satellite performance, including ephemeris data, integrity
information broadcast by SBAS can be used as an indication of ephemeris validity. SBAS uses ground subsystem
receivers installed over very long baselines, therefore this provides optimum performance for ephemeris monitoring
and thus achieves small MDEs; and
c) Ephemeris data monitoring. This approach involves comparing the broadcast ephemeris over consecutive satellite
orbits. There is an assumption that the only threat of failure is due to a failure in ephemeris upload from the
constellation ground control network. Failures due to uncommanded satellite manoeuvres must be sufficiently
improbable to ensure that this approach provides the required integrity.
7.5.10.1 The monitor design (for example, its achieved MDE) is to be based upon the integrity risk requirements and
the failure model the monitor is intended to protect against. A bound on the GPS ephemeris failure rate can be determined
from the reliability requirements defined in Chapter 3, 3.7.3.1.3, since such an ephemeris error would constitute a major
service failure.
7.5.10.2 The GLONASS control segment monitors the ephemeris and time parameters, and in case of any abnormal
situation it starts to input the new and correct navigation message. The ephemeris and time parameter failures do not exceed
70 m of range errors. The failure rate of GLONASS satellite including the ephemeris and time parameter failures does not
exceed 4 × 10-5 per satellite per hour.
7.5.11 A typical GBAS ground subsystem processes measurements from 2 to 4 reference receivers installed in the
immediate vicinity of the reference point. The aircraft receiver is protected against a large error or fault condition in a single
reference receiver by computing and applying the B parameters from the Type 1 or Type 101 message to compare data from
the various reference receivers. Alternative system architectures with sufficiently high redundancy in reference receiver
measurements may employ processing algorithms capable of identifying a large error or fault in one of the receivers. This
may apply for a GRAS network with receivers distributed over a wide area and with sufficient density of ionospheric pierce
points to separate receiver errors from ionospheric effects. The integrity can then be achieved using only the protection levels
for normal measurement conditions (VPLH0 and LPLH0), with appropriate values for Kffmd and σpr_gnd. This can be achieved
using the Type 101 message with the B parameters excluded.
23/11/06 ATT D-24
Attachment D Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications
7.6 Continuity of service
7.6.1 Ground continuity and integrity designator. The ground continuity and integrity designator (GCID) provides a
classification of GBAS ground subsystems. The ground subsystem meets the requirements of Category I precision approach
or APV when GCID is set to 1. GCID 2, 3 and 4 are intended to support future operations with requirements that are more
stringent than Category I operations. The GCID is intended to be an indication of ground subsystem status to be used when
an aircraft selects an approach. It is not intended to replace or supplement an instantaneous integrity indication communicated
in a Type 1 or Type 101 message. GCID does not provide any indication of the ground subsystem capability to support the
GBAS positioning service.
7.6.2 Ground subsystem continuity of service. GBAS ground subsystems are required to meet the continuity specified
in Appendix B to Chapter 3, 3.6.7.1.3 in order to support Category I precision approach and APV. GBAS ground subsystems
that are also intended to support other operations through the use of the GBAS positioning service should support the
minimum continuity required for terminal area operations, which is 1–10–4/hour (Chapter 3, Table 3.7.2.4-1). When the
Category I precision approach or APV required continuity (1-3.3 × 10–6/15 seconds) is converted to a per hour value it does
not meet the 1–10–4/hour minimum continuity requirement. Therefore, additional measures are necessary to meet the
continuity required for other operations. One method of showing compliance with this requirement is to assume that airborne
implementation uses both GBAS and ABAS to provide redundancy and that ABAS provides sufficient accuracy for the
intended operation.
7.7 GBAS channel selection
7.7.1 Channel numbers are used in GBAS to facilitate an interface between aircraft equipment and the signal-in-space
that is consistent with interfaces for ILS and MLS. The cockpit integration and crew interface for GBAS may be based on
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