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in Chapter 3, 3.1.3.11.3 or 3.1.5.7.3.
2.8.2.9.5 Interruption of facility operation due to primary power failures is avoided by the provision of suitable standby
supplies, such as batteries or “no-break” generators. Under these conditions, the facility should be capable of continuing in
operation over the period when an aircraft may be in the critical stages of the approach. Therefore the standby supply should
have adequate capacity to sustain service for at least two minutes.
2.8.2.9.6 Warnings of failures of critical parts of the system, such as the failure of the primary power supply, must be
given at the designated control points.
2.8.2.10 In order to reduce failure of equipment that may be operating near its monitor tolerance limits, it is useful for
the monitor system to include provision to generate a pre-alarm warning signal to the designated control point when the
monitored parameters reach a limit equal to a value in the order of 75 per cent of the monitor alarm limit.
2.8.2.11 Protection of the integrity of the signal-in-space against degradation which can arise from extraneous radio
interference falling within the ILS frequency band or from re-radiation of ILS signals must also be considered. Measures to
prevent the latter by critical and sensitive area protection are given in general terms at 2.1.10. With regard to radio
interference it may be necessary to confirm periodically that the level of interference does not constitute a hazard.
2.8.2.12 A far field monitor can provide additional protection by providing a warning against the extremely remote
probability of the radiation of false information from a localizer facility, as indicated in 2.8.5.
2.8.2.13 In general, monitoring equipment design is based on the principle of continuously monitoring the radiated
signals-in-space at specific points within the coverage volume to ensure their compliance with the Standards specified at
Chapter 3, 3.1.3.11 and 3.1.5.7. Although such monitoring provides to some extent an indication that the signal-in-space at all
other points in the coverage volume is similarly within tolerance, this is largely inferred. It is essential therefore to carry out
rigorous flight and ground inspections at periodic intervals to ensure the integrity of the signal-in-space throughout the
coverage volume.
2.8.2.14 An equipment arrangement similar to that at 2.8.2.9, but with no transmitter redundancy, and the application
of the provisions outlined in 2.8.2.11, 2.8.2.12 and 2.8.2.13, would normally be expected to achieve the objectives for
integrity and continuity of service Level 2.
ATT C-35 23/11/06
Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications Volume I
2.8.2.15 An analysis of the factors involved in different types of operations allows the determination of desired values
for the integrity, expressed in terms of the probability in any one landing, to be determined from the allowable global risk
factor criterion. See 2.14.2 c).
2.8.3 The stringent requirement for integrity and high continuity of service essential for Category III operations
requires the use of ILS Facility Performance Category III equipment having adequate assurance against failures. A failure is
taken to be performance outside the monitor system tolerances specified in Chapter 3, 3.1.3.11 for Category III localizers and
3.1.5.7 for Category III glide paths. Reliability of ground equipment operation must be very high, so as to ensure that safety
during the critical phase of approach and landing is not impaired by a ground equipment failure when the aircraft is at such a
height or attitude that it is unable to take safe corrective action. A high probability of performance within the specified limits
has to be ensured. Facility reliability in terms of mean time between failures (MTBF) clearly has to be related on a system
basis to the probability of failure which may affect any characteristic of the total signal-in-space. The system must ensure the
highest degree of protection against failure of the monitors to detect a failure in performance of the ground equipment. It is
suggested that States endeavour to achieve reliability with as large a margin as is technically and economically reasonable.
2.8.3.1 The following configuration is an example of a redundant arrangement suitable for Category III operations. The
localizer facility consists of two continuously operating transmitters, one connected to an antenna load. With these
transmitters is associated a monitor system performing the following functions:
a) monitoring of operation within the specified limits of the main transmitter and antenna system by means of a
majority voting among redundant monitors;
b) monitoring of the standby equipment.
2.8.3.1.1 Whenever the monitor system rejects one of the equipments the facility will no longer have Category III
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