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personal qualities affecting the processes of emotional reaction and
behavior in non-standard conditions (increased tension and stress),
and, when identifying any unfavorable signs, to approach more
severely the resolution of any question of their suitability for
conversion training;
5.2.6. To develop and implement remedial measures targeted at
maintaining a high level of flight safety in conditions of intensified
air traffic during familiarization with new aircraft types;
5.2.7. To develop and implement the emergency layout diagram of the A-
310 airplane for the airport emergency and rescue services;
5.2.8. To exclude a perfunctory approach in debriefing flight crews in
relation to the results of analysis of the circumstances of accidents
and incidents, as well as any other events that have affected or may
affect the level of flight safety;
5.2.9. To issue tickets for all the crew members flying as passengers
without adding them to the flight task list;
5.2.10. To correct any other faults that have been revealed in the
course of this investigation as well as during the audit conducted by
Airbus in April 2006.
5.3. To the Airbus Group:
5.3.1. Together with the engine developers, to investigate the possibility
of having and developing a unified procedure for engaging reverse
thrust, irrespective of the engine type or the presence of a deactivated
thrust reverser;
5.3.2. To investigate the possibility of changing the algorithm for the
activation of the “wrong take-off configuration” warning in order to
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
124
prevent its activation during any irrelevant stages of a flight or to
insert the relevant caution in the FCOM about the possibility of
activation of this warning during a landing run, as well as the
appropriate crew actions in this situation;
5.3.3. To reword the caution in the TR 02-78 A-310 MMEL chapter in
order to remove any incorrect or ambiguous information to ensure
precise understanding of the caution.
5.4. To EASA and other Certifying Authorities together with the
Manufacturers of Large Transport Aircraft
5.4.1. to review the human factors issues associated with the dispatch
conditions and the operational procedures in case of one thrust
reverser being inoperative, in order to avoid inadvertent forward
thrust application;
5.4.2. to review the design and maintenance requirements for all FADEC
controlled airplanes to ensure that throttle lever breakout forces
remain at the acceptable lever and that they are checked on a periodic
basis;
5.4.3. to evaluate the usefulness of cabin crew smoke hood devices in
assisting the evacuation of airplanes; to evaluate the possibility of
equipping large transport airplanes with devices for passengers and/or
flight attendants to be used in case of an emergency evacuation
without suffering from the effects of smoke and toxic fumes.
5.5. To IATA
5.5.1. The investigation showed that other events occurred on different
types of aircraft, involving inadequate monitoring and erroneous
activations of the reverse thrust levers during a landing run in a
configuration with one engine reverser deactivated. The Interstate
Aviation Committee recommends drawing the attention of operators
to the risks of erroneous movement of the thrust levers in these
conditions and their non-detection.
5.6. To “Domodedovo” Airport:
5.6.1. To the staff engaged in the registration of passengers, to enter on air
tickets the actual weight of hold luggage and hand luggage, and to
enter all required details in the registration information;
5.6.2. To require loading and centre-of-gravity supervisors to enter
information carefully and in good time and to make corrections to the
airplane’s centre-of-gravity diagram and loading chart in accordance
with the actual information available;
5.6.3. To require loading agents to strictly comply with the rules for
completing carriage documentation, including whenever inserting any
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
125
corrections in air cargo manifests for the carriage of hazardous
cargoes.
5.7. To the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):
5.7.1. To examine the question of urgently introducing the video
recording of any situation in the cockpit as an ICAO standard at least
for aircraft with a maximum take-off weight of more than 27,000 kg.
5.8. To the Aviation Authorities of Russia and the Countries
participating in the Agreement on Civil Aviation and the Use of
Airspace:
5.8.1. Along with flight crews and cabin crews (flight attendants), as well
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