曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
unit). The commission does not have other official information on actual friction
forces of other airplane because in the course of the investigation Airbus failed
to comply with the relevant request to carry out a one-time inspection of its fleet
of airplane.
Note: According to EASA regulations a complete fleet
inspection is launched when there is a continuous
airworthiness concern, but low friction forces in
REG.
SER
№
Date of manufacture
А/С FH
A/C FC
Forces required to
move left/right TCLs
Forces required to
move left/right TCLs
after adjustment
UK 31001 574 1991 51986 12307 0.54/0.4 1.32/1.32
UK 31002 576 1991 53508 12730 0.38/0.55 1.41/1.45
UK 31003 706 1998 30757 6301 1.04/1.09 1.32/1.32
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
59
throttle control linkage are not considered to be
an airworthiness issue as changes are felt by pilots
on a daily basis and there are no hidden abnormal
conditions.
1.16.5. Results of investigations made on engine control
computers (FADEC)
As a result of a study of the information stored in the non-volatile memory
of the computers controlling the left and right engines that were dismantled at
the scene of the accident, it was established that:
• during the accident flight, both engines worked in accordance with
the commands given by the position of the corresponding TCL;
• there were no signs that the fuel supply to the left engine was shut
down using the high-pressure shutoff valve;
• it was impossible to determine whether the high-pressure shutoff
valve of the right engine was used;
• three reports about errors recorded by the FADEC of the left engine
at the flight level (altitude of 37,415 feet; Mach 0.8) were related to
the functioning of the internal system measuring the quantity of fuel
supplied and could not affect the outcome of the flight;
• a report about a surge-type error recorded after the airplane
overshot the runway at Mach 0.11-0.12 at an altitude of about 2000
feet was most probably related to the destruction of the left engine
as a result of its collision with obstructions on the ground;
• there were no reports of any faults in the right engine FADEC
during the accident flight.
1.16.6. Results of examining the engine control console
An inspection of the engine console showed that it was heavily deformed and
damaged and partially burnt. All the remaining couplings were tightened and
locked. Both links from the reverser levers to their crank gears were damaged
and deformed at least twice and in opposite directions. The fractures observed
on both links were in static mode and due to dynamic load. The rivets from the
left cam to the crank assembly were broken and therefore the left cam was free
in movement. The speed brake lever was bent to the right as well as the
dynamometric rods. The major part of the throttle levers was burnt. The
surviving parts of the throttle levers with the rockers were deformed in the
opposite direction to the speed brake lever.
After the melted aluminium parts were removed, it was observed that:
• The connection of the left crank to the cam was broken. The position of
the left crank corresponded to left cam position between "idle" and "rev
idle".
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
60
• The position of the left throttle corresponded to a reverse lever
somewhere in upward position as the throttle rocker was on stop position
(blockage of the throttle).
• The position of the right crank was not broken and corresponded to close
to full forward thrust). The right throttle rocker had no more physical link
with its crank.
Following conclusions were made as a result:
• The examination showed incoherent information between the positions of
the cranks/cams and the positions of the throttle rockers.
• On the base of this analysis and due to the state of the components,
additional examination would not allow revealing reliable information
about the possible positions of the throttles and reverser levers at the time
of the accident.
1.17. Information on Organizations and Management
ОАО Aviakompania Sibir
ОАО Aviakompania Sibir was the operator of the А-310 airplane FOGYP
and holds operator license no. 31, issued by the FTOA of the RF
Ministry of Transport and valid until March 21, 2007.
The founder of the ОАО Aviakompania Sibir was the Committee for the
Management of the State Property of the Novosibirk oblast. The registered
office of the founder is: Krasny prospect 18, Novosibirsk, Russia 630011. The
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FINAL REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCI(29)
