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set their height according to the distance. The crew corrected their vertical and
lateral deviations from the set trajectory correctly and in due time.
Consequently, upon emerging from the cloud cover the airplane was at the
set altitude with a minor deviation to the right. In switching over to visual
piloting, the airplane captain made a small elevator deflection to pitch down
which led momentarily to an increase in vertical speed and activation at
22:43:30, at 30 meters according to the radio altimeter, of the "SINK RATE"
ground proximity warning.
Based on the FDR data (0º – 18º - TLA), the Captain moved both thrust
levers from 51.6º to 36.6º (idle before touchdown) to control the speed of the
airplane. At 22:43:40.5 the airplane captain landed the airplane at a speed of 244
kph (132 knots) with a vertical G of 1.2, without banking, at a distance of about
200-300 meters from the offset threshold of runway 30.
The landing weight and center-of-gravity settings were 113,572 kg and
29.8% respectively. These values did not exceed the established limits.
Note: The crew did not fully complete the actions
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
97
prescribed by Sibir A-310 SOP for pre-landing planning
and landing operation. Thus, in accordance with clause
3.1.7 of the SOP, when carrying out an approach
landing based on an inaccurate system, the crew ought
to have announced (by speaking aloud) the changes in
the FMA modes and passing control points during their
pre-landing descent. These operations were not fully
carried out.
The co-pilot did not make the call-out when
reaching the decision height. The captain did not
announce the decision to land or the command to set the
landing course on the FCU.
These shortcomings did not affect the landing
operation, but they attest to insufficient precision in the
crew’s observance of the established work procedures.
Immediately after touchdown (main strut compression), with the spoiler
handle armed, all spoiler sections were automatically released (seven sections of
each wing surface).
1.5 seconds after touchdown the reverse thrust lever (RTL) of the right
engine was moved to idle by the captain, and 3 seconds after that, after the
reverser doors were in their working position, switched to maximum reverse
thrust. Engine reverse thrust then started to increase. In violation of SOP’s, the
co-pilot did not call out the completion of reverser door movement to the
working position (Rev Green). The crew did not activate the reverse thrust lever
for the left engine.
Note: In operating the А-310 airplane with P&W 4000
engines, it is not recommended to use the reverse thrust
lever of an engine whose thrust reverser has been
deactivated. This fact rules out the possibility of applying
a uniform procedure for controlling reverse for various
airplane modifications and in case of any asymmetric
use of the reverse. There are no physical or electrical
blockages against any erroneous displacement in the
direction of forward thrust of the throttle control lever
for an engine whose thrust reverser has been
deactivated.
Section TR 02-78 of the Master MEL and the
corresponding section of Sibir’s MEL, defining the
features of operating an airplane with a deactivated
thrust reverser, contain a warning that the pilot flying
the airplane must hold the thrust lever in the idle
position during a landing run to prevent any inadvertent
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
98
movement of the thrust lever in a forward direction.
Sibir’s FPTP does not provide for any training to
learn this skill.
Afterwards the airplane captain began to shift the RTL of the right engine
to reduce reverse thrust. Simultaneously with moving the RTL of the right
engine, the FDR records a change in position of the TCL of the left engine,
which in 3 steps, over 16 seconds, increased from 36.6º (idle, 0º - TLA) to 59º
(~60% of the full rated takeoff thrust, 26º - TLA). It should be noted that the
direction and periods of movement of the RTL of engine no. 2 to reduce the
reverse thrust and the TCL of engine no. 1 to increase forward thrust coincide.
Analysis of data from the flight data recorder and the results of the
investigations showed that:
• no failures of airplane and engine systems, including FADEC and
TCC, which could have led to the inadvertent movement of the
TCL, were discovered;
• after deactivation of the auto-throttle and before the airplane's
touchdown, the airplane captain initiated regular control of engine
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FINAL REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCI(52)
