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The chronology of events is based on the recordings from the ATC centres at
Dakar and Brest and the Air France OCC. At this stage of the investigation, the
BEA has not yet had access to the data from the Recife (ATLANTICO) and Sal
(SAL OCEANIC) centres.
Synchronisation of the exchanges between the ATC centres is difficult and
remains uncertain. In this chapter, the times have been rounded to the nearest
minute, which is the scale of uncertainty.
The exchanges between the various control centres concerning the lack of
contact with flight AF447 are detailed in Chapter 1.9 Communications.
The following table mentions, as an indication, the forecast times of entry of
flight AF447 into the FIRs, estimated from the Initial Flight plan Processing
System (IFPS) data, taking into account the last communication with the
ATLANTICO centre, during which the crew announced that it was passing the
INTOL point at 1 h 33.
ACC AND FIR CODE TIME REPORT POINT COUNTRY
ATLANTICO (SBAO) 1 h 33 INTOL BRAZIL
OCEANIC DAKAR
(GOOO)
2 h 20 TASIL SENEGAL
OCEANIC SAL
(GVSC)
3 h 43 POMAT CAPE VERDE
CANARIAS (GCCC) 4 h 37 IPERA SPAIN
CASABLANCA
(GMMM)
6 h 02 SAMAR MOROCCO
LISBOA (LPCC) 6 h 47 BAROK PORTUGAL
MADRID (LECM) 7 h 22 BABOV SPAIN
BREST (LFRR) 8 h 01 DELOG FRANCE
PARIS (LFFF) 8 h 35 NORMI FRANCE
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
42
Representation of some of the FIRs crossed by the trajectory of fl ight AF447
The following timeline was made from the still fragmentary information
collected at this stage, which will be supplemented during the investigation.
Any interpretation that goes beyond the factual data mentioned could lead
to erroneous analysis.
At 4 h 11, the DAKAR controller asked flight AF459 to contact flight AF447. The
crew of flight AF459 sent a message to Air France at 4 h 18 so that the airline
should try to contact flight AF447. At 4 h 24, Air France asked flight AF447 via
ACARS to contact DAKAR OCEANIC.
At 5 h 50, after several unsuccessful attempts to obtain information on flight
AF447, Air France contacted the SARSAT (Search and Rescue Satellite Aided
Tracking) centre. The latter had not detected any beacon transmission. Acting
upon the advice of SARSAT, Air France contacted the Cinq Mars La Pile Regional
Control Centre.
At 6 h 00, the Cinq Mars La Pile Regional Control Centre called the BREST
centre (CRNA west) and asked it to contact the centres involved with flight
AF447. The BREST centre contacted the adjacent SHANWICK centre for it to
contact the SANTA MARIA centre (Azores). The latter said that it did not have
any information regarding the flight.
Between 6 h 04 and 6 h 12 the Air France OCC contacted successively the SANTA
MARIA, SHANWICK and CANARIAS (Spain) centres to find out if they had had or
could have contact with AF447, which could be in Moroccan airspace at that
time. In parallel, the Air France OCC also informed the CNOA of the impossibility
of getting in touch with AF447 and asked if there was any alternative means
of detection. At the same time, the SHANWICK centre indicated to the BREST
centre that the airplane would appear to be in Moroccan airspace.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
43
At 6 h 05 the DAKAR controller confirmed to the ATLANTICO controller that
the SAL controller still had no contact with flight AF447. At the same time, the
CANARIAS centre sent a message to the DAKAR centre requesting information
about flight AF447.
At 6 h 13, the BREST centre told the Cinq Mars La Pile Regional Control Centre
that, according to an indirect source that had not been validated, flight AF447
had been in contact with Moroccan ATC.
At 6 h 17, the BREST centre contacted the adjacent MADRID centre to find out
whether LISBOA ATC (Portugal) had information regarding the flight and if it
could ask the crew to contact its airline.
A little later, the BREST centre sent a priority message to the LISBOA, MADRID
and SANTA MARIA centres to request information regarding flight AF447
which was not in contact with its airline’s operations control centre. It sent
this message again at 6 h 24.
At 6 h 32, the BREST centre confirmed to the Cinq Mars La Pile Regional Control
Centre that SANTA MARIA had no information about the flight.
At 6 h 35, the MADRID centre told the BREST centre that the flight was at that
time in contact with CASABLANCA FIR and would enter the LISBOA FIR within
a quarter of an hour. The BREST centre transmitted this information to the
Air France Operations Control Centre and to the Cinq Mars La Pile Regional
Control Centre.
At 6 h 44, after having contacted the CASABLANCA control centre, the Air
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