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contacted him to correct its estimate. The SAL controller replied that the estimate was
probably later. He asked the DAKAR controller if there was any change. The DAKAR
controller then said that he was going to try to contact flight AF447.
33
At 4 h 07 min 4 s, the SAL controller requested confirmation of the flight AF447 estimate. The
DAKAR controller confirmed again that POMAT was estimated at 3 h 45. The SAL controller
pointed out that it was 4 h 8 and that the estimate was not correct. The DAKAR controller
recalled that contact had not been established with flight AF447. The SAL controller stated
that he had identified flight AF459 on his radar whereas its estimate was later than that of
flight AF447. The SAL controller said that he thought that the POMAT estimate was later, at
4 h 29 or 4 h 30. The Dakar controller told the SAL controller that he would call him back.
At 4 h 11 min 53 s, the DAKAR controller asked flight AF459 to contact flight AF447.
At 4 h 20 min 27 s, the crew of AF459 informed the DAKAR controller that they were passing
point POMAT at FL370. They had not succeed in contacting flight AF447 and said that they
had sent a message to Air France so that the airline should try to contact flight AF447.
At 4 h 20 min 36 s, the DAKAR controller asked the crew of AF459 to contact SAL on the
128.3 MHz frequency.
At 4 h 21 min 52s, the DAKAR controller asked the ATLANTICO controller to confirm that
flight AF447 had passed TASIL at 2 h 20 at FL350. The ATLANTICO controller confirmed
that TASIL was estimated at 2 h 20 but that no contact had been made.
The DAKAR controller confirmed to the SAL controller that he still had no radio contact with
the plane and that the estimates were correct.
At 4 h 37 min 7 s, the DAKAR controller asked the SAL controller if he had still not been able
to contact flight AF447 and informed him that, according to the ATLANTICO controller, the
flight should have left the FIR at 2 h 20 and consequently the POMAT estimate should be
3 h 45.
At 4 h 39 min 42 s, the DAKAR controller asked the ATLANTICO controller to confirm that he
had not had contact with flight AF447. The latter replied that he had not had contact at TASIL
but that the first contact was at INTOL at 1 h 33. The DAKAR controller told the ATLANTICO
controller that SAL had not established contact either. The ATLANTICO controller said that
he would call again later.
At 4 h 52 min 36 s, the DAKAR controller called the SAL controller again to ask him whether
he had established contact. He confirmed the estimates at the edges of the FIR and asked
the SAL controller to call him again if he established contact.
At 4 h 53 min 50 s, the ATLANTICO controller called the DAKAR controller again. He told
him that he would check the estimates again and call him again.
At 5 h 01 min 34 s, the DAKAR controller asked the CANARIAS controller if he was in
contact with AF447. The latter replied that he had no information.
At 5 h 06 min 17 s, the SAL controller asked the DAKAR controller if he had a position report
for flight AF447 at the boundary with the ATLANTICO FIR. The latter replied that he had not.
At 5 h 09 min 15 s, the ATLANTICO controller asked the DAKAR controller if he had any
news of flight AF447. The DAKAR controller replied that he hadn’t and then the ATLANTICO
controller requested confirmation that the flight was already in the SAL FIR. The DAKAR
controller replied: "yes, no worry". He also confirmed that SAL had not established contact
with flight AF447.
34
The continuation of the exchanges between the control centres is described in paragraph
1.15.
1.10 Aerodrome Information
The support aerodromes for this ETOPS 120 minute flight were: Natal (Brazil) and Sal
Amilcar (Cape Verde).
1.11 Flight Recorders
At the time of writing of this report, search operations were still under way to try to locate and
recover the Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder.
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information
1.12.1 Localisation of the bodies and aircraft parts
The French and Brazilian navies found debris belonging to the aircraft from 6 June onwards.
All the debris known to the BEA was referenced in a database. By 26 June, this database
included 640 items.
Whenever the information is available, the position, the date and the time of their recovery
are indicated. The chart below shows the position of all of the bodies and debris thus georeferenced.
The bodies are represented by red circles and the debris by white circles. The
tail fin (vertical stabiliser), found on 7 June is represented by a yellow diamond.
35
The timeline of the recovery of the bodies and debris from the aircraft found between 6 June
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