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inclusion of the IR itself. The primary aim of the safety
assessment is to provide assurance, in the form of arguments
and evidence, to support the claim that changes to the IFP
process will be acceptably safe. The scope of the assessment
of the IFP IR was defined first to clarify exactly what was being
assessed. For IFP it was limited to the risks associated with the
discrepancies in key items of the flight-plan in the pre-flight
phase. This criterion accepted that the system covers all
aspects of the ATS environment including people, procedures
and equipment. The assessment therefore concentrated
specifically on the following:
• Hazards that could lead to incidents or accidents
• The potential causes and consequences of those hazards
• Necessary risk reduction measures and resultant safety
requirements
A functional model was constructed for the IR along with
models of the logical architecture and timeline. These were
used to help identify the potential hazards that needed to be
mitigated. Once completed, they were taken to a hazard
assessment workshop where experts from Air Navigation Service
Providers (ANSPs) and EUROCONTROL checked them out to
make sure they were complete and correct. The workshop
looked at the models to identify, categorise and confirm
EUROCONTROL AND ACI EUROPE EXPERTISE: CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING AVIATION
138
potential hazards applicable to the situation prior to
implementing the changes to the IFP process and after its
implementation. Having categorised hazards common to both
pre- and post-IFP they then identified unique hazards.
Once the Workshop had decided where the IFP implementing
rule could alter the consequences or causes of the common
hazards it then looked for the potential consequences of each
hazard using Event Tree Analysis. Following that, the Workshop
used Fault Tree Analysis to identify the possible causes of each
IFP hazard. The same process was then used for the unique
hazards. Having done this the workshop then compared the
hazards, consequences and causes for the pre- and post-IFP
situation. This provided the basis for the determination of the
Safety Requirements. Subsequently, they identified any potential
safety benefits from implementing the proposed IFP process
and documented their findings.
The output from the Workshop was then put through
additional analysis again using Fault and Event Trees to
construct causal and consequence models. These hazard
models have since been used to derive the safety requirements
for the IR covering the IFP ‘system’ at a logical-architecture level
as well as issues relating to the safety process which are to be
addressed by those people and organisations affected by the
rule. Dr Tiemeyer explained, “The safety assessment
demonstrated that a sufficient and necessary set of Safety
Requirements had been specified, and that the overall risk of an
accident or safety incident will be reduced as a result of the IFP
IR Safety Requirements, subject to confirmation at the
implementation stage.”
The safety argument is based on the top level claim that,
within the scope, and subject to the assumptions presented in
the Implementing Rule, the implementation of the IFP IR will be
acceptably safe in principle, where:
• acceptably safe means that the risk of an accident or safety
incident is no higher, and preferably lower than that for the
pre-IR situation
• in principle means that the validity of the Claim is subject to
the complete and correct satisfaction of the requirements of
the IR by the responsible agencies
The first batch of the interoperability IRs is now with the
European Commission for discussion and completion and is
expected to be approved by the Single Sky Committee before
the end of 2005.
“The safety assessment
demonstrated that the
overall risk of an accident
or safety incident will be
reduced as a result of the
IFP IR Safety Requirements”
© Athens International Airport
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IATA PERSPECTIVE
ON SAFETY
Safety issues are extremely high on the agenda of IATA’s European Safety,
Operations and Infrastructure group. “For IATA it is simply the most
important activity – priority number one,” says Dragica Stankovic, Assistant
Director Safety, Operations & Infrastructure. Mark Pilling reports
© Arne V Petersen
141
afety is IATA’s top priority. IATA continues its campaign
towards reducing the accident rate by 25 per cent by
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A vision for European aviation(47)
