曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
hearback problems accounted for 10 per cent of the events,
and communications equipment problems caused 8 per cent.
Analysis suggested that call-sign similarity caused 33 per cent
of the identified incidents, incorrect frequency change 12 per
cent, and so on. The incidents were analysed in detail, and so
were their consequences. In 36 per cent of the cases there
were no adverse consequences, but in 23 per cent the
nightmare of all controllers occurred: Prolonged Loss Of
Communications (PLOC). If a controller has delivered a new
clearance and does not get an acknowledgement before
losing communication with the cleared aircraft, the stress
among all parties to the situation is high while the controller
battles to keep other aircraft clear as he/she watches to see
whether the clearance instruction is carried out or not.
One part of the solution that EUROCONTROL is pushing is
the replacement of voice communication with VHF datalink
131
(VDL). The use of controller/pilot datalink communication
(CPDLC) for routine clearances, as set out in EUROCONTROL’s
CASCADE (Co-operative ATS through Surveillance and
Communication Applications Deployed in ECAC)/Link 2000+
programme, replaces voice on busy airwaves. It also reduces
the chance of the wrong aircraft picking up a clearance
intended for another; it sidesteps the problems associated
with stuck transmitter switches or simultaneous transmissions,
and is an alternative means of contact in the event of the loss
of voice communications.
However VHF datalink communication is only one part of
the strategy being pursued by Blajev’s team. Most of the
outcome of his analysis looks as if it will concentrate on
promoting awareness of the need for communications
discipline: that is to say, the use of ICAO standard
phraseology, standard operating procedures, and care in the
operation of communications equipment.
Reducing AGC problems will reduce the risk of inadvertent
runway incursion and of level bust by misunderstanding. But it
will not eliminate them. Some incursions or level busts are the
results of other forms of Human Factors (HF) problems, or
they may be the results of airports with poor signage or
lighting, or of standard arrival and departure procedures that
are poorly designed and thus overly demanding. The HF
influence in all the problems identified within the SSAP are a
major EUROCONTROL concern, and the means of tackling the
problem is a combination of providing information designed
to generate awareness of the specific problems, backed up by
education and training courses.
So the information is being gathered, the lessons are being
learned, the messages are being delivered, and delivery of
results is being measured. There is still a lot of work to be
done to improve ATM safety, but all the participants are now
united in working toward the same objectives.
EUROCONTROL AND ACI EUROPE EXPERTISE: CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING AVIATION
132
SYSTEMATIC SAFETY
ASSESSMENT FOR
EUROPEAN ATM
The introduction of the Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) is giving
Europe’s air navigation service providers a set of qualitative and quantitative
tools with which to ensure that new systems or changes to existing systems are
safe when they enter service and stay that way throughout their operational
lifetimes. Brendan Gallagher looks at the methodology and how it is being used
133
he Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) is a tool that
is now being implemented in part by a number of Air
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) within ECAC States.
It allows for a systematic approach to assessing the safety
implications of changes to existing systems and procedures
and the introduction of new ones.
SAM is being developed and disseminated to national
service providers by the Safety Assessment Methodology Task
Force (SAMTF), created by EUROCONTROL and more than 20
of Europe’s ANSPs. The methodology is based on a rigorous
sequence of hazard identification, definition of safety and
objectives and requirements and implementation of measures
to bring risk within defined and acceptable limits. It is
intended to come into play every time a change within the
European ATM system is proposed – whether by adding a new
function or enhancing an existing one – and then to operate
throughout the lifetime of the resulting modifications.
SAM is flexible, describing the underlying principles of the
safety assessment process and leaving to the national service
provider the details of how they are applied in each specific
project. It comprises three major steps: the Functional Hazard
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
A vision for European aviation(44)
