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agencies), another objective of the information distribution
network is to be able to present the position of that aircraft
against a geographical map overlaid with the maximum range
of the aircraft, based on what is known about its fuel state.
States would be able to overlay their own information on
locations of sensitive installations. Although that information
would be restricted to the ERRID actor in question, all actors
will be able to see the situation and while it would be up to
the one nearest to the incident to take action, the network
should provide a low-cost means of enhancing situation
awareness and decision support.
Recipients of ERRIDS information could include government
departments responsible for aviation security, intelligence
services, air traffic control centre supervisors, the military,
police, airports and the airlines, according to national
requirements. The police are also involved in the project and
EUROCONTROL are working with Europol, the European Union
law enforcement organisation responsible for handling
criminal intelligence, which could distribute information to
national police forces.
Air defence forces within each State that may also be part
of NATO have a major role in responding to security incidents,
which explains why the other two of the four initiatives involve
civil-military co-operation. One is the development of
processes to optimise the sharing of civil and military ATC and
air defence radar track information of aircraft involved in an
incident. This will enable the authorities to continue tracking
aircraft whose secondary surveillance radar transponders have
been turned off – a low-cost alternative to the proposal to
modify the transponders themselves.
The other initiative was to review and harmonise civil and
military ATC procedures and training for dealing with hijacks
and other emergency situations. The NATO EUROCONTROL
Security ATM Coordination Group (NEASCOG) was set up at an
early stage, and in 2005 the political decision was taken to
make the group a central focal point for co-ordination in ATM
security. The membership base will be expanded accordingly
to include airports, the police, intelligence services and
national governments. There is a collaborative activity through
NEASCOG to improve some of the procedures for handling
security incidents.
In another part of its programme of work, EUROCONTROL
has developed a security case methodology. This will be
evaluated in the latter part of 2005 and in 2006, both to
evaluate whether the methodology is correct and to
encourage stakeholder buy-in.
As part of the Single European Sky initiative, EUROCONTROL
is developing guidance material to help Member States to
meet the new European Commission regulations for
certification of air navigation service providers, one part of
which relates to security. The agency will also be providing
input on security to the definition phase of the Sesar project
to develop an ATM master plan.
There are two other European Commission projects in
which EUROCONTROL is a part. The first is the Protection of
Air Transportation and Infrastructure (PATIN) project, which is
part of the Security Research Programme due to start work in
early 2006. The other is the Safety of Aircraft in the Future
European Environment (SAFEE), which started in 2004 in the
6th Framework Programme. EUROCONTROL has an advisory
role assisting with defining the operational concepts and with
the evaluation. Further work with the European Commission is
planned as part of the 7th Framework Programme to evaluate
some of these new security concepts together, which will
hopefully make civil aviation even more secure in future.
ATM AND AIRPORTS: CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE
79
THE SECURE AIRPORT
Chris Yates reviews the state of airport security in Europe
hand grenade in the hold, a handgun in the cabin,
the shoe bomber, knives and imitation pistols
successfully smuggled on board as hand luggage…
sharp reminders that security remains the aviation industry’s
primary concern and its principal challenge. Guaranteeing
total security is widely acknowledged to be impossible, but
the effort to achieve the highest possible standard has to be
unremitting. This takes time, resources, dedication,
intelligence, technology – and money.
The suicide hijackings of 11 September 2001, as well as
attacks on other transportation modes during the past four
years, have shown us there is now even greater pressure on
industry specialists not just to detect and deter but to
actually stop a possible terrorist outrage in its tracks.
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A vision for European aviation(22)
