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NORTH ATLANTIC MNPSA OPERATIONS MANUAL CHAPTER 8
NAT MNPS 53 Edition 2009
8.5.11 Furthermore, Operators/Pilots are reminded that before operating in an area of Compass Unreliability they are responsible for checking with their State Authorities whether specific regulatory approval or training is required.
Deliberate Deviation from Track
8.5.12 Deliberate temporary deviations from track are sometimes necessary, usually to avoid severe weather; whenever possible, prior ATC approval should be obtained (See para 11.4). Such deviations have often been the source of gross errors as a consequence of failing to re-engage the autopilot with the navigation system. It should also be noted that selection of the 'turbulence' mode of the autopilot on some aircraft may have the effect of disengaging it from the aircraft navigation system. After use of the turbulence mode, extra care should be taken to ensure that the desired track is recaptured by the steering navigation system.
8.6 POST-FLIGHT PROCEDURES
Inertial Navigation System Accuracy Check
8.6.1 At the end of each flight, an evaluation of accuracy of the aircraft's navigation systems should be carried out. Equipment operating manuals specify maxima for radial errors before a system is considered to be unserviceable. For early gimballed-platform inertial systems these are in the order of 2 NM per hour. One method used to determine radial error is to input the shutdown ramp position; in other systems error messages are output giving differences between raw inertial reference positions and computed radio navigation updated positions. Whatever method is used, a record should be kept of the performance of each INS.
8.7 HORIZONTAL NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE MONITORING
8.7.1 The navigation performance of operators within NAT MNPS Airspace is monitored on a continual basis. The navigation accuracy achieved by NAT MNPS aircraft is periodically measured and additionally all identified instances of significant deviation from cleared track are subject to thorough investigation by the NAT Central Monitoring Agency (CMA), currently operated on behalf of ICAO by the UK National Air Traffic Services Limited. The CMA also maintains a data base of all NAT MNPS Approvals. The CMA runs a continuous monitoring process to compare this Approvals list with the records of all aircraft flying in the NAT MNPS Airspace. The Approval status of any aircraft involved in a track deviation is specifically checked against the data base and in any cases of doubt the State of Registry is contacted.
8.7.2 When a navigation error is identified, follow-up action after flight is taken, both with the operator and, where the deviation is 25 NM or more (i.e. a GNE), the State of Registry of the aircraft involved, to establish the circumstances and contributory factors. The format of the (navigation) Error Investigation Form used for follow-up action is as shown at Attachment 1. Operational errors can have a significant effect on the assessment of risk in the system. For their safety and the safety of other users, crews are reminded of the importance of co-operating with the reporting OAC in the provision of incident information.
8.7.3 The overall navigation performance of all aircraft in the MNPS Airspace is continually assessed and compared to the standards established for the Region, to ensure that the TLS is being maintained
NORTH ATLANTIC MNPSA OPERATIONS MANUAL CHAPTER 8
NAT MNPS 54 Edition 2009
NORTH ATLANTIC MNPSA OPERATIONS MANUAL CHAPTER 9
NAT MNPS 55 Edition 2009
Chapter 9: RVSM Flight in MNPS Airspace
9.1 GENERAL
9.1.1 The aircraft altimetry and height keeping systems necessary for flying in RVSM airspace are capable of high-performance standards. However it is essential that stringent operating procedures are employed, both to ensure that these systems perform to their full capabilities and also to minimise the consequences of equipment failures and possible human errors.
9.1.2 As is the case with lateral navigation systems, technical failures of altimetry and/or height keeping systems are extremely rare within the NAT MNPSA. However, less rare in the NAT MNPSA are situations in which an aircraft is flown at a level other that cleared by ATC. ATC Loop Errors, when there is a misunderstanding or miscommunication between ATC and the pilot over the actual cleared level, unfortunately do occur. In an SSR environment ATC are alerted immediately when aircraft departs from the cleared level. Furthermore with Direct Controller Pilot Communications (DCPC) the controller can instantly intervene to resolve the situation and/or to provide potential conflict warnings to other traffic. In the NAT MNPSA SSR coverage is very limited and regular air/ground ATC communications are usually conducted via a third party radio operator, most commonly using HF.
9.1.3 Severe turbulence in the NAT MNPSA is uncommon but mountain waves in the vicinity of Greenland and clear air turbulence associated with jet streams are not unknown. Aircraft encountering such conditions can inadvertently depart from their cleared levels or the pilot may elect to change level to avoid the effects of the turbulence. Other circumstances also occur in which the pilot will be forced to change level, before an appropriate ATC re-clearance can be obtained, e.g. power or pressurisation failure, freezing fuel, etc. Again, without surveillance or DCPC, there can be a significant lag between the aircraft‟s departure from its cleared level and any possible action from the controller to provide separation from any other potentially conflicting traffic.
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NORTH ATLANTIC MNPS AIRSPACE OPERATIONS MANUAL(43)
