曝光台 注意防骗
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Delta to Delta 1. I quickly checked my Airport Facility
Directory which, of course, did not indicate taxiway
numbers. Since I could see Delta 3 ahead of me, I decided
to taxi down it until I saw Delta. Once on D3, however,
the confusion of lights and the odd angles of runway and
taxiway intersections…confused me and…I found myself
taxiing down Runway 2 with no immediate way off. I
immediately notified Ground Control that I was ‘lost’ and
needed some help. The controller [gave]… me guidance off
the runway, but she also gave me a chiding…Chagrined,
put off by the controller’s response, and experiencing a
sort of 2-dimensinal spatial disorientation among the
lights, I made another false start onto Runway 6...and in
the darkness, overshot the somewhat faded hold line for
Runway 31 by about 10 feet, advised the Tower thereof…
and taxied clear of the runway environment.
Given my years of experience as a pilot, this was an
embarrassingly bad performance. I am fully aware that
I should have been more aware of the taxiway plan of
the field…or should have demanded progressive taxi
instructions.
“The Problem Was of My Own Making”
A Center controller described a conflict event when
aircraft climb rates were anticipated—but misjudged.
n Two passenger aircraft in climb phases were
northbound, and the B767 was also in climb phase
westbound. The northbound aircraft were climbing at
approximately 1,500 fpm while the B767 was climbing
about 1,000 fpm. The B767 was below the crossing traffic
and not climbing as quickly when I issued a climb to the
same altitude as the others. All aircraft would continue
to climb in the next higher stratum. I expected to get a
higher altitude from the next controller for the northbound
aircraft in conflict so that it would not level off for some
reason and become a problem. Just before initiating
the land line call, I observed the altitude of the B767 go
to ‘XXX.’ I thought this was due to the proximity of the
aircraft laterally from the radar antenna. I questioned
the altitude of the B767 and it reported FL182 and the
other aircraft was leaving FL195. I realized that the B767
had increased its rate of climb substantially and to the
point that the radar displayed ‘XXX’ since the aircraft
was outside the computer’s programmed climb envelope.
I ordered the B767 to ‘level off’ and told the MD90 to
expedite climb through FL210 for traffic. The B767
reported the other aircraft ‘in sight, no factor’…The B767
reported leveling at FL196. I do not know if separation
was maintained…
The problem was of my own making by anticipating
[performance] based on current climb rates.
“We Created a Separation Problem”
A corporate flight crew created a separation problem
with landing traffic by anticipating their exit route from
the runway and not communicating this to the Tower in
advance. Here are details from the Captain’s report to ASRS.
n We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway
19C. We briefed the approach and landing to vacate and
Taxiway Y5 (high speed) to minimize time on the runway
as indicated in the ATIS. I used maximum reverse thrust
and light braking. The aircraft was slowed sufficiently
to be able to make the reverse high speed, Taxiway Y4.
Tower had advised on rollout to take the next high speed
available (Y5). Upon exiting, in an effort to clear the
high speed for the next landing traffic, we requested to
Number 354 June 2009
Communication Factors
in ASRS Reporting
any better. With help from Maintenance, we were able to
transfer/balance the fuel. The fueler had pre-filled out
the fuel slip. It showed 10,600 pounds in each tank even
though the fuel was only loaded into the right tank and not
any uploaded into the left tank. He was fully prepared to
deliver this slip to the flight deck as is! After we transferred
the fuel into balance, it took over 30 minutes to complete
the new fuel slip…I actually pointed out to the fueler the
warning about the 1,000 pounds maximum imbalance
allowance, but either he could not read English or didn’t
understand what I was saying.
The Call Sign Factor
Aircraft call signs have long contributed to aviation
communications problems for some of the following reasons:
• Airline flight numbers are normally consecutive and
therefore similar (1234, 1235, etc.)
• Airlines schedule flights with similar call signs to be in the
same airspace at the same time
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