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that the ramp was clear and proceeded to guide aircraft
to parking spot. First Officer and Captain visually cleared
their respective sides of the parking area and noted no
obstructions, the area looked clear/normal and ground
equipment was behind ‘foul lines’ from what we could see
from the cockpit. As the guide man signaled for the Captain
to slowly apply the brakes, the cockpit crew felt a ‘thump’
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from
The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
July 2007 Report Intake
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 2624
General Aviation Pilots 920
Controllers 107
Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 259
TOTAL 3910
ASRS Alerts Issued in July 2007
Subject of Alert No. of Alerts
Aircraft or aircraft equipment 6
Airport facility or procedure 11
ATC procedure or equipment 6
Total 23
followed by some airframe vibration. The APU was online
running electrical and AC, the Captain directed that we
shut down the left engine. (The right was secured prior to
turning onto the lead-in line.) The Captain said he thought
something must have happened to the left engine [but]
there were no abnormal engine indications in the cockpit.
The Captain called for the parking checklist, which the
crew completed. The Flight Attendant called from the back
and informed the Captain that the yellow hose had been
sucked into the left engine as the aircraft came to a stop. As
per procedure, the ground crew signaled he had control of
the aircraft. He had full responsibility for ground clearance
and avoidance.
“Where Is This Guy Taking Us?”
A communications breakdown between the cockpit and a
tug driver at a foreign location led to a pushback with no
one in positive control of the aircraft – and to some soulsearching
afterwards by the involved flight crew.
■ The pushback began in a normal fashion. Engine
start was uneventful until the after start flows were
accomplished. At that point we experienced a problem with
the left bleed air valve...The MEL showed this as a return
to gate item. At this point, I told the mechanic we needed
to be tugged back in. His response sounded like he was
asking us to release the parking brake, however, neither of
us quite understood what he had said about the brakes. I
asked him if he was asking us to release the parking brake,
to which he responded, ‘Release parking brake.’ I released
the parking brake and the tug operation commenced. With
the tug operation underway, I turned my attention to the
logbook, thinking about how I was going to write up this
problem. The First Officer put away the QRH and then was
looking over the MEL, which listed restrictions about flying
in icing conditions. What to me seemed like a few seconds
after we began to be tugged, the First Officer rhetorically
asked, ‘Where is this guy taking us?’ As I looked up I saw
the end of the paved ramp approaching rapidly and heard
the First Officer say something about stopping the aircraft.
At that point we were both simultaneously on the brakes...
After leaving about 20 feet of skid marks on the ramp, the
aircraft came to a stop with the nosewheel approximately 8
feet from the end of the paved surface...and without the tug
connected!!
After stopping the aircraft and shutting down the engines
and trying to comprehend what had just happened, my
next concern was the location of the mechanic and if he
was okay. He was okay. Although this mechanic speaks
fairly good English, I was truly surprised at the level of
communications breakdown that had just occurred...He
told me he thought I was telling him I was releasing the
parking brake. Once we started rolling he did not tell us to
stop, but instead simply unplugged his headset and got out
of the way.
What lessons can be learned or relearned from all of this?
First of all, this is a reminder of something we all know,
that being tugged is an operation which requires someone
to be monitoring the aircraft. Secondly, never assume
333
anything. Since we never saw the tug pull away (it pulled
away while we were in the books), and we were told to
release the parking brake, we thought we were under tow...
Also, next time I have determined I need to do a return
to gate, I will shut down the engines sooner...We were so
distracted by what was going on that neither of us thought
of shutting down the engines, nor did it seem critical at the
moment since we thought we were under tow....
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