曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
mode while my head was down and not slowed down at
10,000 feet. We subsequently slowed and landed normally...
The approach was very rushed...If my First Officer had
announced his change from descent mode to speed mode on
the autopilot, I would have been cued to be more observant
at 10,000 feet. Still, as a Captain I need to ensure that the
10,000 feet/250 knots requirement is met no matter the
cockpit congestion and resolve to be more aware, especially
because of the emphasis this particular issue has received.
“Short of Impact”
ASRS is receiving an ever-increasing number of air carrier
ramp incident reports. In this incident, a pushback ‘snake
dance’ almost resulted in a ramp collision.
■ We were cleared to push and began our pushback. Both
pilots noted that the tug driver drifted the aircraft 4 feet
left of centerline and then made an aggressive cut back
to centerline. This correction was never really taken out
and the aircraft ended up well right of centerline (my
estimate was 18 feet). We both made comments on how far
the aircraft was off the centerline. The Captain then set
the parking brake and I went heads down to start the #2
engine. [The aircraft at] gate XX called for and received
clearance to push...The Captain noted their movement
and told me to call ramp and stop their push. I did so,
stating that ‘aircraft at gate XY is well right of centerline
and we need you to stop the push.’ Ramp made that call,
but the B737 at XX did not respond. I was now getting
very concerned so began making directive calls on ramp
frequency. ‘Aircraft at gate XX stop your push!’ I made that
call at least two times but they were still moving back (on
centerline at least). In desperation, I gave the emergency
stop signal to our wing walker...He began running to the
XX tug and stopped their push. When they stopped, the
leading edge of their #1 engine was abeam my seat, so I
estimate that they were just 15 feet short of impact...I am
submitting this for two reasons...It is not at all unusual
for pushes...to ‘snake dance’ plus or minus 10 feet of the
centerline. On many occasions I have seen pushes like this
one where a small deviation results in larger deviations
that rapidly become unsafe...This leads me to the second
point, We had a wing walker. I never saw one at [gate] XX.
Our wing walker was key to averting an unsafe situation....
“Short Field Takeoff and Landing”
This very short report describes a standard flight procedure
went awry for a PA28 pilot landing at a private grass strip.
■ Because of recent heavy rains our landing strip had a
wet area in the middle of the strip. This necessitated short
field landing and takeoff procedures. My approach was a
few feet to the left. My left wingtip caught some cornfield
plants causing my plane to turn to the left and skid to a stop.
“A Short Announcement”
For a GA pilot taking off from a non-Tower field, climb-out
over an obstruction led to afterthoughts about use of the
CTAF.
■ My preflight briefing stated that the east taxiway was
closed, no reason given. After run-up, I was ready to depart
Runway XX, the calm wind runway that is about 5,100 feet
long. A light twin had just landed on Runway XY. There
was some activity on the south half of the east taxiway,
too far away to identify and of no obvious interest since I
knew the east taxiway was closed. The runway was clear
and I announced my departure and my intended turn to
the north. During the takeoff roll, I discovered that vehicles
(or a disabled aircraft) had moved onto the runway,
apparently to cross to the west side of the field. Since I
could lift off several thousand feet before the obstruction
and clear it by several hundred, I considered a takeoff safer
than a high-speed abort and continued my takeoff. No
announcement of any kind had been made on the CTAF.
It is certain that my radio was working properly since I
listened to the ASOS before switching frequencies and I
confirmed the correct frequency was set...A short but clear
announcement by the obstructing party would have been
helpful.
Number 345 September 2008
In 1993, following several publicized
maintenance-related aviation incidents and accidents,
Transport Canada developed programs which would serve
to reduce maintenance error. In close collaboration with the
aviation industry, Transport Canada subsequently identifi ed
12 human factors – called the “dirty dozen” – that may lead
to maintenance errors. Since then, maintenance technicians
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
CALL BACK 3(41)
