曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
accomplish this check after engine start it was prudent to move the 757/767 flight
controls check to be common with other models.
86. Can we use the Assumed Temperature Method for reduced thrust with a tailwind on our 757 and
767 airplanes? Our 757 airplanes may not use the ATM for reduced thrust when a tailwind is
present, but the 767 may use ATM with up to a 10 kt tailwind.
<Answer>. We are unaware of any tailwind restriction associated with use of the assumed
temperature method for reduced thrust.
87. We experienced a power loss on a 767 operating into Bogota. The event was caused by improper
ground of a bracket for a TRU shelf. What is the latest status of the investigation?
<Answer>. A 767 airplane, while enroute from Buenos Aires to Washington, experienced an
electrical power system failure in flight forcing it to declare an emergency and divert to
Bogota, Colombia. All electrical generators appeared to have been working properly, but
the aircraft electrical system failed in such a way that Advisory and Status messages were
displayed on the upper EICAS display with the illumination of main battery discharge,
antiskid and auto speed brake indicator lights on the P5 overhead panel. The F/O
displays (EADI/EHSI) also went blank, and the left VHF radio was intermittent through
out the remainder of the flight. The crew suspected loss of both main AC buses and
diverted. From the time of the initial indication to touchdown in Bogota, the aircraft flew
2004 Flight Operations Symposium Questions 8/23/2004 10:19 AM
May 9 – 12, 2004, Bell Harbor Convention Center
Page 15 of 15
for approximately 42 minutes, while battery bus and standby DC bus power was being
supplied mainly by the Main Aircraft Battery.
It was determined that the bracket that holds the grounding studs for the TRU-L, TRU-R
and Battery Charger, had high bonding resistance; this resulted in the DC bus voltage
falling below acceptable limits on these buses. The main battery was forced to carry the
battery bus and standby DC bus loads. Boeing considers this single failure condition to
account for the multiple Advisory and Status messages condition experienced in
N644UA. The F/O display blanking is considered an isolated event and is still under
investigation.
88. We have experienced where bleed light illuminates inflight and on takeoff. The Boeing
procedures say the OFF light should be illuminated, but this is not the case?
<Answer>. Boeing Flight Operations Technical Bulletin 767-72 has been issued and addresses this
phenomenon. This FOTB has been released in paper form but is also available via
internet at MyBoeingFleet.com.
89. Speedbrakes are armed, but the spoilers don’t deploy. Has this been reported to Boeing
previously?
<Answer>. The Airplane Maintenance Manual has a discussion regarding this issue. There is no
flight deck feedback that the speedbrakes are armed. Please see FRM 27-62-00/101, Fig.
104, Block 1 and AMM 27-62-01-00.
90. Are there recommended flight tests out of C & D checks to verify?
<Answer>. Recommended tests are in the Airplane Maintenance Manual. Flight tests are not
recommended unless specifically mentioned.
2004 Flight Operations Symposium Questions 8/23/2004 10:20 AM
May 9 – 12, 2004, Bell Harbor Convention Center
Page 1 of 6
757/767 Caucus Report
1. Operators would like to see the Battery Start procedure included in the ops manual Supplemental
Procedures.
<Answer>. Boeing will be reviewing our documentation and manuals to improve the visibility of the
Battery Start procedure.
2. The REVERSER ISOLATION VALVE non-normal procedure includes the following note:
“Additional system failures may cause inflight deployment”. This caution note applies to both the
757 and 767 and should be clarified or elaborated upon. Are there additional status or caution
messages associated with this condition that the flight crews should be aware of?
<Answer>. With the third locking system installed the L/R REV ISLN VAL advisory level alert
message is inhibited above 80 knots on the takeoff roll; however the message can still
display during taxi out. As such, there must be a checklist to address possible display of
the message during taxi.
With the addition of the third lock and associated changes, Boeing demonstrated that an
in-flight T/R deployment is extremely improbable; less than e-9. Note that Boeing
analyzes both powered and unpowered deployment. Further, if the sleeve actually
moves, the Rev Amber or Rev Green will be displayed; these are not inhibited in flight.
3. Most operators cycle circuit breakers. There is concern that the new Boeing policy which advises
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
B757_Symposium_(2004)(8)
