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Flight IB6024 (Airbus A340) passed at the level of the ORARO waypoint at
FL370 approximately twelve minutes after AF447.
The crew saw AF447 take off while taxiing at Rio de Janeiro. When passing the INTOL
waypoint, they encountered conditions typical of the inter-tropical convergence
zone. These conditions were particularly severe 70 NM to 30 NM before the
TASIL waypoint. They moved away from the route by about 30 NM to the east
to avoid cumulonimbus formations with a signifi cant vertical development, and
then returned to the airway in clear skies close to the TASIL waypoint. The crew
reported they had diffi culties communicating with Dakar ATC.
(20)It was this type
of probe, then
produced by
Sextant, that was
installed on Air
France’s aircraft
on the date of
the event.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
68
Flight AF459
Flight AF459 (Airbus A330-203) passed at the level of the ORARO waypoint
approximately 37 minutes after l’AF447.
The sky was clear but the half-moon, visible to the aft left of the aircraft, did
not make it possible to see the contour of the cloud mass distinctly. After
flying through a turbulent zone in the head of a cumulus congestus formation
at the level of NATAL, without having detected this zone on the radar, the
captain selected gain in MAX mode. At about 2 h 00, he observed a first echo
that differed significantly depending on whether the radar’s gain was in CAL
or MAX mode. The TILT was set between -1° and 1.5°. He decided to take
evasive action to the west, which resulted in a deviation of 20 NM to the left
of the route. During this evasive action, a vast squall line with an estimated
length of 150 NM appeared on the screen, which was set to a scale of 160 NM.
The echoes were yellow and red when the radar was set with gain on the MAX
position and green and yellow when the gain was on the CAL position. No
lightning was observed.
ATLANTICO control, informed by the crew of their decision to avoid this squall
line by taking evasive action to the east, asked them to return to the airway as
soon as they could. This evasive action meant the aircraft flew between 70 and
80 NM to the right of the planned route. In addition, the crew was authorised
to climb from FL350 to FL370.
On leaving the ATLANTICO FIR, through the TASIL waypoint, the crew
attempted in vain to contact Dakar control on HF on the 5565 KHz and 6535
KHz frequencies, and on the other HF frequencies given in the on-board
documentation. Likewise, the attempted ADS-C connection was unfruitful.
The crew returned to the airway around the ASEBA waypoint, that is to say
more than 28 minutes after the first theoretical contact with Dakar control.
They reported slight turbulence on the edge of the convective zone.
Radio contact was established with Dakar control at about 3 h 45, close to the
SAGMA waypoint. The SELCAL test was performed and the controller asked
the crew to try to contact AF447. Several attempts were made on various HF
frequencies, and then on 121.5 MHz and 123.45 MHz, without any success.
Flight LH507
Flight LH507 (B747-400) preceded flight AF447 by about twenty minutes at
FL350.
The crew reported that it flew at the upper limit of the cloud layer and then
in the clouds in the region of ORARO. In this zone they saw green echoes on
the radar on their path, which they avoided by changing their route by about
ten nautical miles to the west. While flying through this zone, which took
about fifteen minutes, they felt moderate turbulence and did not observe any
lightning. They lowered their speed to the speed recommended in turbulent
zones. They saw bright St Elmo’s fire on the windshield on the left-hand side.
The crew listened on the 121.5 MHz frequency throughout the flight without
hearing any message from AF447.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
69
1.18.4 Procedures to be applied in case an unreliable speed indication is
detected
On the date of the accident, the operator’s procedures mention that the
following actions must be carried out from memory by the crew when they
have any doubt concerning the reliability of a speed indication and when
control of the flight is “affected dangerously”:
If conduct of the flight does not seem to be affected dangerously, the crew
must apply the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION / ADR CHECK procedure (see
appendix 9).
For information, the “Memory Item” in the Airbus QRH relative to the same
fault is shown below in the version in force on the date of the accident.
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2. INITIAL FINDINGS
On the basis of the first factual elements gathered in the course of the
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本文链接地址：
Interim report on the accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbu(27)
