曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
The competence to perform standardisation inspections
has been assigned to us also for these
areas. The role of Standardisation will therefore be
essentially the same as in all other fields. However
in Aerodromes and ATM/ANS, the mechanism and
the intensity of cooperation were different from
the JAA system. This is why we need to intensify
our cooperation with Member States and EUROCONTROL
as early as possible to be able to facilitate
the transition process. Clearly, our newly assigned
competences overlap with present EUROCONTROL
activities. We are therefore going to cooperate
with EUROCONTROL with a view to optimise our
activities within the standardisation framework established
by the Basic Regulation.
Thomas Mickler
Standardisation: Taking cooperation with Member
States to the next level
05 FEB. 2010 EASANEWS Europea n Aviation Safety Agency
By the EASA Certification Directorate
Current situation_ The ultimate objective of aviation
safety management is to prevent accidents.
Monitoring the aircraft in-service experience is
essential to obtain a view of the achieved safety
level, to identify targets for improvement, and validate
or further develop airworthiness standards.
Thanks to the constant improvements in the safety
of the design of modern aircraft, accidents are
rarely caused by a single reason, but by combinations
of causes. This also means that precursors
exist to most accidents. Further improvement in
safety can be achieved if the precursors are identified
and dealt with before they combine into a
deadly chain of events.
To give a legal foundation to this priority activity,
the European legislator mandates EASA to continu-
Continuing Airworthiness
and Occurrence Reporting
ously monitor the Continuing Airworthiness of approved
type designs (CAW) as an obligatory core
activity, as defined in article 20.1 (j) of the Basic
Regulation (EC) No. 1108/2009.
Identification and mitigation of safety risks_ The
activities to be subsumed under the term “CAW of
approved type designs” are deriving from “Part 21”
of Regulation (EC) No. 1702/2003 and comprise a
large variety of analytical tasks aiming at the identification
and mitigation of established or potential
safety risks, such as (non-exclusive list):
monitoring potential safety issues related to daily
operations of approved type designs by analysing
reported in-service difficulties and occurrences;
performing regular airworthiness reviews with
Type Certificate (TC) holders;
involvement in accident and incident investigation
and responding to safety recommendations;
investigating and resolving all proven and suspected
unsafe conditions;
exchanging safety data with foreign authorities
in line with Bilateral Agreements and Working Arrangements;
reviewing and approving appropriate corrective
actions developed by TC holders;
reviewing TC holders´ risk assessments and decision
making on their acceptability;
drafting, publishing and disseminating relevant
safety information in the form of Airworthiness
Directives (ADs) and Safety Information Bulletins
(SIBs).
All of the above is achievable only on the basis of
complete, unambiguous and reliable data, i.e. occurrence
reports and/or any other safety-related
information available from, for example, accident
and incident investigations, National Aviation Authorities
(NAAs), bilateral partners (such as US,
Canada) and approved organisations. Today, in
the “Part 21” process, the primary source of occurrence
data for the Certification Directorate are
the TC holders of aeronautical products, parts and
appliances. This is an indirect link where the information
flows from the operators to the TC holder,
who processes it and then contacts the Agency
when an unsafe or potentially unsafe condition is
identified. The tasks performed by the TC holder
are monitored by the Design Organisation Approval
(DOA) and are, therefore, under EASA control.
However, the upstream part of the dataflow, i.e.
the transmission of the information to the TC
holder, is outside of its control and of the EASA
monitoring.
The only way for EASA to control this part of the
data flow is to access data reported by operators,
maintenance and production organisations,
through their competent national authorities
where relevant. EASA already receives some relevant
“direct” data, but on an irregular and limited
basis from NAAs and Accident Investigation Boards
(AIBs), from other reporting entities on “EASA
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
EASA-Newsletter-issue-4(5)
