在随后的两分半钟，机头逐渐下压；期间飞行员竭尽全力，但无法控制：From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the stabilizer position gradually moved in the AND directionfrom 2.3 units to 2.1 units. During this time, aft force was applied to the control columns which remained aft of neutral position. The left indicated air speed increased from approximately 305 kt to approximately 340 kt (VMO). The right indicated air speed was approximately 20-25 kt higher than the left.The data indicates that aft force was applied to both columns simultaneously several times throughout the remainder of the recording.
At 05:41:30, the Captain requested the First-Officer to pitch up with him and the First-Officer acknowledged.
At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not workingand asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied thatit is not working.
At 05:42:54, both pilots called out “left alpha vane”.
At 05:43:04, the Captain asked the First Officer to pitch up together and said that pitch is not enough.
飞行员再次反复手动上拉：At 05:43:11, about 32 seconds before the end ofthe recording, at approximately 13,4002 ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU direction. The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.
九秒钟后，机头再次自动向下俯冲，最后角度高达40度：At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft began pitching nose down.Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40° nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.
十三秒后，飞行记录仪最后的读数：The last recorded pressure altitude was 5,419 ft on the left and 8,399 ft on the right.
调查报告发布后，埃航发表声明, 埃航302飞行员在最困难的情况下，完全按照波音和FAA紧急操作流程行事：
The preliminary report clearly showed that the Ethiopian Airlines Pilots who were commanding Flight ET302/10 March have followed Boeing's recommended and FAA's approved emergency proceduresto handle the most difficult emergency situation created on the airplane. Despite their hard work andfull compliance with the emergency procedures, it was very unfortunate that they could not recover the airplane from the persistence of nose ping.
美国飞行员联合会发表声明，MCAS失灵是非常严重的紧急事件：
The initial findings of the Ethiopian investigation confirm for us that an MCAS malfunction is a serious emergency and not a benign event
波音公司发布声明称，波音将提供软件补丁修复MCAS问题，发展综合全面的飞行员训练和教育项目，而飞行员总是能够取消MCAS，手动操作飞机：
The preliminary report contains flight data recorder information indicating the airplane had an erroneous angle of attack sensor input that activated the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) function during the flight, as it had during the Lion Air 610 flight.
To ensure unintended MCAS activation will not occur again, Boeing has developed and is planning to release a software update to MCASand an associatedcomprehensive pilot training and supplementary education programfor the 737 MAX.
As previously announced, the update adds additional layers of protection and will prevent erroneous data from causing MCAS activation. Flight crews will always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane.
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