Federal Aviation Administration Surveillance
Business Jet Services was initially certificated on July 24, 1998, by the Dallas FSDO. On March 15, 2000, the company‘s operating certificate was transferred to the Oklahoma City FSDO. The Business Jet Services principal maintenance inspector (PMI), who was based in Oklahoma City, had been in that position since 2000. The PMI was also responsible for the surveillance of three other Part 135 operators, four repair stations, one flight school, and one airplane and powerplants school.
A review of the FAA‘s Program Tracking and Recording Subsystem records indicated that, from January to November 2004, the PMI visited Business Jet Services 15 times and accomplished all of the required surveillance items, which included a maintenance records review
18 To identify a frequency, the nonflying pilot listens for a specific, audible Morse-code pattern, which is received by the VHF NAV receivers.
on May 6, 2004. No maintenance procedures or record-keeping discrepancies were noted by the PMI in the FAA‘s records.
Safety Recommendation A-05-08
As a result of the June 13, 2003, Air Sunshine, Inc., flight 527 accident, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-05-08, which asked the FAA to do the following:
Review the procedures used during its oversight of Air Sunshine, including those for the Surveillance and Evaluation Program [SEP] and Regional Aviation Safety Inspection Program, to determine why the inspections failed to ensure that operational and maintenance issues that existed at the company were corrected. On the basis of the findings of this review, modify Part 135 inspection procedures to ensure that such issues, including maintenance record-keeping and practices, are identified and corrected before accidents occur.19
In response to the safety recommendation, the FAA indicated that it will review and revise FAA Order 8300.10, —Airworthiness Inspector‘s Handbook,“ to enhance inspectors‘ awareness of inadequate record-keeping systems and the timely correction of record-keeping discrepancies. The FAA noted that because the SEP was designed and used for Part 12l operators, it was not applicable to Air Sunshine. The FAA stated that FAA Order 1800.56, —National Flight Standards Work Program Guidelines,“ provided guidelines for the establishment of a surveillance work program. Pending the FAA‘s revisions to Order 8300.10, Safety Recommendation A-05-08 was classified —Open–Acceptable Response,“ on January 18, 2006.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FAA Order 7110.65, —Air Traffic Control,“ states that approach controllers are required to issue the current touchdown RVR for the runways in use when the prevailing visibility is 1 mile or less or when the RVR indicates a reportable value (an RVR that is fewer than 6,000 feet). FAA Order 7110.65 also states that approach —controllers shall ensure that pilots receive the most current pertinent weather information. Ask the pilot to confirm receipt of the current ATIS information if the pilot does not initially state the appropriate ATIS code.“ The CVR did not record the Houston TRACON controller question the first officer when he stated that he had ATIS information —Kilo“ instead of information —Quebec“; notify the flight crew of the current ATIS, which at that time was information —Romeo“; or provide the flight crew with the current RVR.
19 For more information, see the Board‘s Web site at <http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2005/A05_08_10.pdf.>
ANALYSIS
General
The flight crew was performing an instrument precision approach; therefore, the presence of low cloud ceilings and reduced visibility should not have affected the pilots‘ ability to fly the approach.
The Houston TRACON controller did not correct the first officer when he stated that he had ATIS information —Kilo“ instead of —Quebec“; confirm that the flight crew had the most current weather, ATIS information —Romeo,“ and RVR; or question the first officer when he read back the incorrect runway assignment,20 as required by FAA Order 7110.65. However, because the RVR and weather conditions had not changed considerably since the time the first officer received the information and the CVR recorded the flight crew correctly reference the runway later in the approach, the controller‘s errors did not contribute to the accident.
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：Crash During Approach to Landing Gulfstream G-1159A (G-III),(12)
